Fighting City Hall with the Equality Rights Provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by Baker, Jonathan
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
1985 
Fighting City Hall with the Equality Rights Provisions of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Jonathan Baker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Elder Law Commons, and the Labor and 
Employment Law Commons 
TheAdvocate 69
Fighting City Hall with the Equality
Rights Provisions of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms
by Jonathan B. Baker
Baker, Young
Barristers and Solicitors
Vancouver, British Columbia
The principal guaranty of equality to be found in the American Constitution is the clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment which provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Since its ratification after the Civil War the "equal
protection clause" has probably been invoked upon more occasions and thus subjected to
more judicial analysis than any other constitutional guaranty.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of Constitution Act which is
Schedule B of Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) has expanded the scope and importance of the
concept of equality along American lines so that acts of the legislature may be declared
unconstitutional.()
There are three "equality rights" provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms:
"15(l) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particu-
lar, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups includ-
ing those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation
and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.
28. Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in
it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons."
Section 15 does not come into effect until April 17th 1985. Since it is similar in wording to
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution it is likely that Canadian Courts will
consider American Decisions in matters of interpretation. An understanding of American theory
and Decisions may help to predict the areas of attack on existing legislation.
SCOPE OF THE CHARTER'S EQUALITY RIGHTS PROVISIONS
Primacy of the Charter. By section 52(1) the Charter is given primacy over all other laws in
Canada, including the Canadian Bill of Rights, and the anti discrimination laws of all provinces.
By Section 32 (1) the Charter is made applicable to Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures.
The Charter does not specifically prohibit the invasion of rights by private actions. It is not
unlikely however that Courts will follow the American Courts in proscribing even private
actions that are entwined with governmental policies and impregnated with a governmental
Character.(2)
THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS
In cases dealing with fundamental constitutional rights a profound change in the presump-
tions surrounding municipal by-laws is underway making it easier to set aside a by-law.
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The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently stated in Ontario Film and Video Appreciate
Society(3 ) that there is no presumption for or against legislation in any determination as to what
is 'reasonable' under s. 1 of the Charter. The court sharply rejected the suggestion that
Canadian 'Courts will exercise considerable restraint in declaring legislative enactments statu-
tory or regulatory, to he unreasonable'.
This is in accord with the American rule stated in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim (4)
as follows:
"First I would emphasize that the presumption of validity that traditionally attends a
local government's exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if any, weight, where
the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expression protected under the First
Amendment ... after today's decision it should be clear that where protected First
Amendment interests are at stake, zoning regulations have no such 'talismanic
immunity' from constitutional challenge."
Unreasonableness
Section 148 of the Vancouver Charter(56 provides that a by-law or resolution passed by
Council shall not be set aside, on account of "unreasonableness". This and other similar
provisions may be short lived.
In the United States, the test of unreasonableness permeates the law in determining whether
a right of equal protection has been infringed. Moreover, the standards of reasonableness vary
with the area of rights that are infringed. Basic freedoms such as those of speech, religion, or
association must meet an extremely rigorous test, while a less strict test is applied to taxation
statutes. (6)
Unreasonableness - Taxation and Assessments
Section 719 of the Municipal Act which requires Council to take into consideration whether
the prescribed charges are excessive appears to meet many of the requirements of equal
protection and the decisions reached by our courts are consistent with those in some but not all
of the States.(7)
Timing. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption of validity of state
taxation systems. (Lehnhoausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.).(") However, in a series of
decisions arising out of Florida where 'impact fees' (similar to our development cost charges)
were considered a number of defects in municipal and enabling legislation came to light. The
Courts determined that an ordinance should specify the time when monies are to be expended
for capital improvements. (9) Our Municipal Act(0) has no such timing requirement.
Maximum Fees. Whereas Sec 719 of the Municipal Act provides that council shall take into
consideration whether charges are excessive, another Florida court reviewing impact fees")
held that the fee simply cannot exceed the cost of the improvements required by the new
development and the improvements must adequately benefit the development which is the
source of the fees.
Indirect Benefits. Section 719 (4), (8) of the Municipal Act permits the imposition of
Development Cost charges for capital costs that will indirectly serve the development.
Although the Florida decisions did not rest entirely on equal protection grounds, they held that
benefits could not be too indirect. Therefore, if benefits become too indirect and remote, this
fact may become the basis of a constitutional attack on both Section 719 of the Municipal Act
and any by-law enacted pursuant thereto. Our Supreme Court has already held in Delsom
Estates Ltd. v. Delta(12) that a Municipality could not relate a charge to the cost of acquisition
of unrelated lands in the municipality.
Discrimination as to Localities
The broadest ground for attacking any provision of the Municipal Act or the Vancouver
Charter, may be that there is no reasonable basis for applying these two separate acts to
different areas of the Province. In so doing residents have been denied equal protection and
equal benefit.
The rule stated in 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law (sec. 506) is as follows:
"Legislation limited in its operation to a portion of the state or prescribing different
rules for distinct areas is not invalid as denying the equal protection of the laws to
individuals, where there is a reasonable basis for the limitation or differentiation and
all persons similarly situated in the same place are treated alike;"
Since the difference in areas to which the Vancouver Charter and Municipal Act are
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applicable are arguably not based upon population or any other rational factor, a resident of
Burnaby, New Westminster or Vancouver, could under certain circumstances allege a denial of
equal protection. (1)
PLANNING AND ZONING
Discretion
Vancouver's controversial discretionary zoning system promises to be a fertile field for consti-
tutional challenge. Vancouver Charter, S. 565. Provides that Council may make by-laws
designating zones in which there shall be no uniform regulations and delegating to any official
of the city or to any board ... such powers of discretion relating to zoning matters which to
Council seem appropriate; similarly Section 717 of the Municipal Act empowers Council to
regulate everything but density and use on a site specific basis.
If the Courts follow some American Authorities these sections of the Vancouver Charter and
Municipal Act may be declared unconstitutional.(14 )
The manner in which standards, rules and regulations are applied may present a problem for
municipalities. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees rights
and freedoms "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstr-
ably justified in a free and democratic society". Where a zoning by-law is administered pursuant
to departmental guidelines that have not been adapted by Council either by by-law or resolu-
tion, such guidelines may not constitute 'reasonable limits prescribed by law'.
CONTRACT ZONING, LAND USE CONTRACTS, DEVELOPMENT PERMITS AND
COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In American Zoning law 'contract zoning' refers to an arrangement which imposes different
and usually additional restrictions on the land re-zoned, and (b) has been an inducement to the
municipal authorities to rezone the land. Since a different deal is likely to be made on each
occasion, this raises squarely the question of the uniformity rule and the consitutional question
of equal treatment. The courts have frequently held such arrangements invalid, although there
is a strong recent authority to the contrary and the count of states pro and con is now
approximately even - so that there is no clear majority rule. (15)
Ordinances similar to Vancouver's Comprehensive Development by laws have been held
violative of equal protection, as has the common practice of attaching special conditions to
Development Permits.
In a Florida decision a Zoning amendment to permit a shopping center in Coral Gables was
passed subject to several conditions e.g. - a "bay Point type" wall to be placed 40 feet from
certain lot line, an agreement on suitable lighting etc. In an action brought by a neighbour
across the street the court held that a municipality had no legal authority to enter into such a
contract, in effect for amendment of the Zoning ordinance for the particular situation, and that
the use of such arrangements would eliminate uniform and equal treatment in Zoning.
The court stated,
"in exercising its Zoning powers the municipality must deal with well defined classes
of uses. If each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of variables that could
enter into private contracts then the whole scheme and objective of community
planning and zoning would collapse."
On the other hand cases favouring contract zoning have come down in New York and
Massachusetts. (16
Prohibition of Land Use
Section 2 of the Vancouver Charter allows the City to prohibit a particular use of land. The
Court in Romeo's Pizza & Steak House Ltd. v. City of Victoria, (17) held that since this power
was not expressly provided in the Municipal Act Municipalities had no such power.
The Future of the Vancouver Charter Section is now uncertain.
In the U.S., the total exclusion of any one kind of land use may carry the strong taint of
unlawful discrimination and a denial of Equal Protection as to the excluded use.11s
Uniformity
Sub-Zones. Vancouver's Official Development Plan by-laws which permit in effect the cre-
ation of sub-zones within zones and which are subject to different procedural rules than
ordinary zones, may be in for stormy times. Under the American equal protection clause, [and
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Under Canadian Common law as well] where a zoning regulation applies in one part of a
zoning district but not in another, it may be illegal.
Thus, a suburb of New York adopted a provision permitting retail on the ground floor only in
one part of an apartment district; public garages were permitted in Knoxville only on U.S.
highways (in effect, on one street in the district); and rendering was permitted in only one of
four similar industrial districts mapped in a small city in Wisconsin. All these were held to be
invalid, and the last to be a violation of equal protection as well.( 9)
The lack of consistent policy in mapping. In Massachusetts zoning amendments may be
found invalid for lack of uniformity; An amendment to legalize the manufacturing of ice, in a
solidly residential area near Buzzards Bay, was held invalid. (Whittemore v. Building Inspec-
tor of Falmouth,(20)) A special new funeral parlour district was established in Salem and a tract
consisting of two lots was shifted into this district; the court held this invalid spot zoning. (21)
The Plan as a test of Reasonableness. In many United States jurisdications the courts have
held that a zoning map that does not follow a comprehensive plan is therefore unreasonable.
British Columbia municipalities which fail to adapt plans may risk an attack on their zoning by-
laws accordingly.
Variance and special Permits. Where variance and/or special or conditional permits are
granted under a loosely defined set of guidelines and standards, they may in some states be
held violative of the equal protection clause. (22)
LAND USE CLASSIFICATION
The Vancouver Zoning by-law includes such distinctions as "public authority" use, and
"office" use. In essence a government office may be treated differently from private office.
Again, such favouritism may be unconstitutional.(23)
RE-ZONING
In the case of Vandy v. Corporation of Delta(24) Mr. Justice Hinds reviewed the grounds for
attacking a Council decision not to re-zone the petitioner's property. Essentially, the court
stated that there must be proof of discrimination in fact and there must be an improper motive
on the part of Council. The application of 'equal protection' arguments may provide additional
ammunition i.e. unreasonableness and inconsistancy.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.(25) the Court
held that downzoning of an area identified for integrated multifamily residential use may imply
discriminatory intent and that a single decision to downzone, made in reaction to a develop-
ment proposal, may be enough to support an attack on Equal Protection grounds. The proof of
the discriminatory intent is to be found in the administration of the regulations, not the express
criteria.
The auihorities in Boston rezoned a single lot in Brighton :,r additional depth of business
zoning. This was held invalid for the single lot, with the opinion pAinting out that the facts cited
showed if anything the need for rezoning a larger area. The rural college town of South Hadley
rezoned to enlarge its commercial district, and this was also held invalid, on the ground that it
was contrary to the recent trend towards residential construction in the area nearby and was
also against the plan implicit in a recent comprehensive rezoning revision. (Mitchell v. Board
of Selectment of South Hadley,(26)
SUBDIVISION
Land Title Act(27) s. 86 confers broad discretionary powers upon an approving officer to
approve or refuse a subdivision plan if he considers it to be against the public interest. The
extent of these powers have been questioned by the B.C. Court of Appeal in Clay v. Spax-
maai( 28). The 'equal protection argument' provides a further grounds for overturning decisions
of Approving Officers when they are exercised without prescribed standards.
Moreover the practice of requiring the dedication of lands as a condition of subdivision
(upheld in Oak Bay Manor Ltd. v. Delta'2') may be subject to challenge in the absence of
specific standards relating to the kinds of conditions that may be required.
SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF ZONING REGULATIONS
In Polai v. Torontoeso' the Supreme Court of Canada held that a municipality in seeking to
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enforce a zoning bylaw was not precluded from the remedy of injunction merely because
others guilty of similar violations have been placed on a list of persons against whom enforce-
ment shall not proceed.
The impact of the Charter of rights on this decision has yet to be determined. If it should
become dead letter, then a number of policies presently in effect in Vancouver and other
municipalities will violate the concept of equal protection. These include the po'icy of non-
enforcement of by-laws based on 'hardship' exemptions or other special deals with Council
and enforcement of by-laws based only on complaints.
Where American courts have found that the Zoning authorities have enforced Zoning regula-
tions in an intentionally discriminatory manner, they have held that such enforcement provides
a defense to the current violation of the regulation under the equal protection clause. The
contention that discriminatory enforcement of a law is unconstitutional had its origin in the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)(31), in which the
court stated that if a law is administered by public authorities
"with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,"
the equal protection of the law is denied.
In prosecutions for violations of Zoning ordinances, courts have reversed convictions and
dismissed prosecutions where the evidence showed that selective enforcement of the ordi-
nance, by failure to enforce it against other violators while attempting to enforce it against the
defendant, was intentional, arbitrary or unreasonable example include a series of cases where
there was evidence that enforcement of the Zoning ordinance depended entirely on the institu-
tion of citizen complaints, where there was evidence of an intention on the part of Zoning
authorities not to enforce zoning regulations against a class of violators expressly included
within the terms of such regulation, and where the authorities not only allowed selective
enforcement but additionally disregarded the restrictions and limitations of that ordinance. (32)
PROVISION OF SERVICES
In one American case, Johnson v. City of Arcadia,(3 the Court held that once a municipal-
ity decides to provide services, it must do so equally. "The standard for service provisions in a
municipal service equalization suit is the quality and quantity of services enjoyed by those
citizens who are favored by discriminatory practices." The Court held for the plaintiffs and
ordered improvements.
PERMITS AND LICENSES
Various discretionary powers relating to licensing are found in the Vancouver Charter and
Municipal Act. For example sections 508 and 513 of the Municipal Act confer powers to
refuse, suspend and revoke licenses. Standards are conspicuously absent.
British Columbia Courts already impose a test of 'reasonableness' and have held that a
Municipal Council may, in its discretion refuse to issue a business licence, the only limit upon
such discretion being that the Council must not act unreasonably. I'
Now, however, if Councils do not prescribe regulations and standards pursuant to which
they exercise these powers of discretion, then administrative decisions and by-laws (even
though they meet a test of reasonableness) may be swept aside.
In Hornsby v. Allen(35 a municipal liquor ordinance was declared unconstitutional. The
Georgia Court stated:
"Mrs. Hornsby was not afforded an opportunity to know through reasonable regula-
tions promulgated by the Board, of the objective standards which had to be met to
obtain a license. The Court held that the board had a duty to give reasons for its
decisions and that it had a duty to adopt reasonable rules and regulations and not to
make arbitrary selections among those qualified."
Although Canadian Courts have arrived at similar results in licensing matters the decisions
have usually turned on the fact that a Municipality in discriminating or in delegating a decision
making power, had exceeded the powers delegated to it under Provincial Legislation.3)
The power of a municipality to ban young persons from Video Arcades may be curtailed. In
Bright v. Langley(37) the B.C. Court of Appeals upheld a by-law which applied a minimum age
to patrons of Arcades. The purpose of the by-law was to prevent the association of petty crime
with the fact of operation of such business.
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A different result occured in one of the States. In Aladdin's Castle Inc. v. City of
Mesquite(38) the Court knocked out an 'arcade' ordinance. It was held that singling out the
machine business as a place where 17 year olds could not congregate in order to prevent
truancy denied the owner of equal protection.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Perhaps out of an abundance of caution Parliament expressly stated in Section 15(2) of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms that Affirmative Action programs are not precluded by the
equal protection-equal benefit clause. The American Courts have been upholding such pro-
grams where there is evidence of an economic disparity between groups.
The kinds of challenges that may be expected include suits launched by minority groups
against municipalities for alleged discrimination in hiring practices; against private contractors or
Unions for discrimination on work 'infected with state action', and finally of course cases
challenging affirmative action programs on the grounds that they do violate the right of 'equal
protection' (notwithstanding the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Charter.
Two points should be made at the outset. Section 15(2) of the Charter of Rights does not
make all affirmative action programs immune to the requirements of 15(1). Such programs
may still be subject to attack depending on how they are prepared and implemented.
Secondly, the American cases have generally required evidence of an 'economic disparity'
between the majority group and the minority group. If in British Columbia an Affirmative action
program was implemented to require the hiring of members of a minority group, and the only
evidence was that the minority was under represented in the work force of the bureaucracy, but
there was no evidence that the group was economically disadvantaged, there is some question
as to whether the program could resist attack under the equal protection clause. ()
CULTURAL GRANTS
Section 269 of the Municipal Act and Section 206 of the Vancouver Charter provides that
a Council may grant aid to a variety of causes including cultural organizations.
A claim could be made for equal benefits. Individuals who belong to ethnocultural groups
which do not receive grants equivalent to those received by the English, French, or others
might be able to invalidate the giving of disproportionate grants to such more fortunate groups.
If grants are made pursuant to laws which do not meet the test of "equal benefit" with respect
to race, national or ethnic origin, or religion, then an application to set aside such grants might
be sought.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Consitution with its 'equal protection
clause' has been called the 'Second American Revolution'.
When Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms comes into effect in
April 1985, it should have a substantial impact. Canadian lawyers will be able to draw on one
hundred and twenty years of American jurisprudence dealing with the term 'equal protection'.
Since at least one case can be found to support virtually any proposition in the United States,
innovative grounds for challenging statutes and by-laws will be available.
Some of the areas vulnerable to attack should include the following:
(1) Unreasonableness in any by-law or statute relating to classifications.
(2) By-laws or statutes affecting fundamental freedoms.
(3) Assessments that do not fairly relate to or that are too remote from benefits.
(4) Discrimination as to localities.
(5) Discretionary and spot zoning.
(6) Lack of uniformity in zoning.
(7) Conditional uses without adequate guidelines.
(8) Discretion exercised by approving officers in refusing subdivisions on the grounds of
'public interest'.
(9) Selective enforcement of zoning or other by-laws.(10) Uneven provision of services.
(11) Discrimination even if authorized by statute with respect to Licensing matters.
(12) Affirmative action programs.
(13) Unequal treatment in providing civic grants.
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(14) Language rights in schools.
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